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shocks. This test is justified with two conceptual frameworks and existing
empirical work on monetary transmission. The results of applying this test
to US data using local projections reject the hypothesis, but are instead con-
sistent with behavioural expectations in housing markets. I also use a sign
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tion demand is the most important driver of US house price cycles, although
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1 Introduction
Housing is the largest asset on most households’ balance sheets, as well as one of the
largest items of consumption, in many developed countries (Piazzesi and Schneider,
2016; Musso et al., 2011). However the cyclical movements in house prices1 have
also been shown to be intricately linked to financial cycles (Borio, 2014) and their
downturns are associated with some of the most serious recessions (Jorda et al.,
2015b). It is therefore very important to understand the drivers of house price
fluctuations as they have huge economic and social implications.
One key consideration is whether changes in house prices are the result of changes
in rational expectations of fundamentals, because otherwise this implies the poten-
tial for housing bubbles that could cause serious macroeconomic shocks when they
burst (Glaeser and Nathanson, 2015). There are very different approaches to the
issue of housing bubbles in the existing literature. The vast majority of theoretical
macroeconomic models that incorporate housing surveyed by Piazzesi and Schneider
(2016) do so in settings in which agents have full information rational expectations2
and there are few frictions in housing markets. As a result house prices in the mod-
els surveyed are equal to the full information rational expectations of the present
value of the stream of future rents. This is referred to as the fundamental value of a
housing asset3. Therefore changes in house prices in these models are always due to
changes in the fundamental value of housing. In reality there are frictions in housing
markets, such as search costs, and it is possible to extend this approach to construct
an adjusted fundamental value that also incorporates these features, as shown by
Dusha and Janiak (2018). There is also a large behavioural housing literature, sur-
veyed in Salzman and Zwinkels (2017), that suggests that house prices may deviate
from fundamental values, even after adjusting for transaction costs and frictions.
1Throughout this paper house prices, housing values, housing rents and other related variables
are all considered in real terms unless stated otherwise.
2Full information rational expectations are defined as agents expectations being equal to the true
conditional expectations of a future variable, conditioning on complete knowledge of the economy:
see the survey in Coibion et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion.
3This definition can be taken from Santos and Woodford (1997) under the condition that there
are no ‘rational bubbles’ or from Glaeser and Nathanson (2015) who use it in a housing context.
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These deviations may result from behavioural features such as non-rational expec-
tations, so changes in house prices need not result from changes in the fundamental
value of housing.
Providing empirical evidence on whether house prices are equal to their funda-
mental value is very hard. Testing the proposition directly is limited by the im-
possibility of estimating the fundamental value of housing without making extreme
approximations, such as those in Mayer and Sinai (2007). Testing the proposition
indirectly is more plausible but has its own problems. If asset prices are equal to
their standardly defined fundamental value then the asset market is efficient, so tests
of efficiency can be used as tests for consistency with asset prices being given by
their fundamental value (Fama, 1970). Even so, testing market efficiency in aggre-
gate house prices remains difficult. Aggregate house price series are not available at
high frequencies, so it is hard to rule out the possibility that time series and event
study predictability of house prices and excess housing returns reflect changes in
risk premia rather than deviations from efficiency. Additionally after adjusting for
transaction costs and rigidities in housing markets the adjusted fundamental value
relation no longer necessarily implies market efficiency. These rigidities include the
time spent searching for a house, property transaction taxes and the institutional
feature of US housing markets that prices are often committed to before exchange
takes place. Therefore a lack of efficiency in housing markets does not necessarily
show an inconsistency with house prices being equal to their adjusted fundamental
value.
The test I introduce in this paper is based on the reaction of house prices to
monetary shocks at time horizons shortly after the shock, but long enough to allow
for contractual rigidities. Monetary shocks are relatively unique as a variable in that
the adjusted fundamental value of housing should have an unambiguously signed
reaction to monetary shocks as soon as the contractual rigidities in housing markets
no longer bind. I illustrate why this is likely to be the case using two conceptual
frameworks that build on the fundamental value of housing: one that also considers
the roles of consumption demand and housing supply and one that also considers
the role of search frictions, as well as relevant empirical work on the transmission
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of monetary shocks. This is a test of consistency with house prices equalling their
adjusted fundamental value, as it is possible that house prices could still react to
monetary shocks as soon as contractual rigidities no longer bind but still not be given
by their fundamental value. However if house prices do not react at the specified
horizon then this rejects house prices being always equal to their fundamental value,
but is consistent with several alternate behavioural explanations of house prices.
I implement this test using narrative shocks in a local projections specification.
This lets me obtain potentially consistent estimates of the timing of the effects of
the shocks, which could be significantly distorted in an auto-regressive model if the
model is mis-specified. The narrative shocks I use are based on the natural ex-
periment approach in Romer and Romer (2004), however I build on this approach
by additionally controlling for information related to housing and financial markets
to ensure that the estimates are as accurate as possible. The results show that
house prices barely react to monetary shocks at a horizon of one to two months,
the length of contractual rigidities, but have clearly statistically and economically
significant reactions at horizons greater than a year. This provides strong evidence
against house prices always being equal to the fundamental value of housing, even
adjusting for the rigidities in housing markets. These results could be explained by
imperfect information, for instance agents in housing markets not observing macroe-
conomic shocks perfectly, or behavioural features such as non-rational expectations,
for instance agents in housing markets not understanding the functioning of housing
markets perfectly. I suggest that both of these features are likely to be important.
As a secondary piece of work I use an approach inspired by the conceptual frame-
works to provide estimates of the relative importance of the consumption demand,
asset demand and supply channels in driving US house price cycles. I use band-pass
filters to capture the cycle in US housing variables and then use sign analysis based
on the linear and rank correlations between the cycles in different series to assess
the relative importance of different channels. I find that consumption demand is
the most important channel. Asset demand also appears to be relatively important,
particularly in some time periods, whereas the supply channel appears to be by far
the least important of the three.
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Overall, I conclude that aggregate house prices do not appear to be always equal
to their fundamental value. Limited information on shocks, non-rational expecta-
tions and behavioural features may all be important features of housing markets.
This suggests that macroeconomic models that are based on full information ra-
tional expectations may be seriously mis-specified. It also suggests that changes
in consumption and asset demand, which are the most important proximal drivers
of house price cycles, may not have their origins in changes in fundamentals, so
investors and policymakers should view them with caution.
This paper is primarily related to two main strands of the existing literature.
The first of these is the empirical literature on whether housing markets can be
explained as the full information rational expectation net present value of a stream
of rents and hence whether housing markets are efficient. Many papers surveyed in
Ghysels et al. (2013) show strong predictability in house prices and excess returns to
housing, so the predictability does not just stem from movements in rents or discount
rates. This predictability has been known since at least Case and Shiller (1989) and
has been confirmed with more modern econometric methods for variables including
past returns (Schindler, 2013), valuation ratios (Campbell et al., 2009) and housing
wealth to income ratios (Balcilar et al., 2019). This predictability has also been
confirmed with respect to specific policy changes in event study approaches, such as
that in Jung and Lee (2017). The predictability also gives rise to clear cycles in house
prices, the stylised facts of which are summarised with a US focus in Sinai (2015), in
the context of financial cycles in Drehmann et al. (2012) and in the context of bubbles
in Glaeser and Nathanson (2015). It is hard to rule out completely time-varying
risk premia as an explanation of these results, but the strength and patterns of the
predictability lead the authors of most of these studies to conclude that housing
markets are inefficient, so deviate from their fundamental values. In a survey of the
literature Glaeser and Nathanson (2015) suggest that deviations of house prices from
their fundamental values could theoretically be explained by search and institutional
frictions in housing markets, but the size of deviations leads them to conclude that
additional factors like non-rationality are also likely to be needed to explain the
deviations. However there do not appear to have been attempts in this literature
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to empirically test whether housing markets deviate from their fundamental values
after taking into account search costs and contractual rigidities.
I primarily contribute to this literature by introducing an empirical method to
study whether house prices are consistent with always being equal to their adjusted
fundamental value, instead of just their fundamental value, which is also robust
to changes in time-varying risk premia. Specifically I study whether there is a
reaction of house prices to monetary shocks as soon as contractual rigidities no longer
bind, as these shocks should have clearly signed effects on adjusted fundamental
values at this horizon. This approach is in the spirit of event studies but focuses on
whether there is a reaction of house prices as soon as prices can respond to the event,
rather than focusing on whether there are lagged reactions which may result from
changes in risk premia or search costs. This is a test for consistency with adjusted
fundamental values, so positive results can theoretically prove that house prices are
not always equal to their adjusted fundamental value, but negative results cannot
prove that they are always equal to their adjusted fundamental value. I implement
this test using narrative monetary shocks in a local projections approach to provide
clear empirical evidence on the timing of the reaction of house prices to monetary
shocks. The results show virtually no reaction of house prices to monetary shocks
at the horizons when contractual rigidities stop binding, despite statistically and
economically significant reactions with sensible signs at much longer horizons. This
strongly suggests that house prices are not equal to their adjusted fundamental
value, so housing market inefficiencies are not simply the result of search frictions
and contractual rigidities.
I make an additional contribution by providing new stylised facts on house price
cycles. Specifically I provide empirical estimates of the relative importance of the
consumption demand, asset demand and supply channels in driving US house price
cycles, on the basis of a sign decomposition suggested by the conceptual frameworks.
I find that the consumption demand channel is the most important and the supply
channel is by far the least important.
The second strand of work that this paper is related to is the empirical mone-
tary shocks literature. This literature aims to estimate the effects of monetary policy
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shocks on a number of different macroeconomic variables, of which house prices are
usually just one. Individual papers take different approaches to this. Older papers,
such as Fratantoni and Schuh (2003), tended to use recursive restrictions to iden-
tify monetary shocks in auto-regressive models. Concerns over the identification of
shocks using this method then led to a series of papers which either augmented or
replaced these zero restrictions with sign restrictions (Del Negro and Otrok, 2007;
Jarociński and Smets, 2008; Musso et al., 2011). Most recent papers have used narra-
tive shocks, which can be used in either autoregressive models (Miranda-Agrippino,
2016), local projections (Jorda et al., 2015a) or both (Coibion et al., 2017). The
broad conclusion of these empirical papers is that expansionary monetary shocks
increase house prices, although these increases often only occur with a lag and the
extent and significance of the increases are fairly variable between papers4. These
results are also broadly consistent with empirical partial equilibrium estimates based
on regulatory changes, such as Bhutta and Ringo (2017), and surveys, such as Fuster
and Zafar (2015). This is because these approaches suggest that changes in interest
rates cause little reaction in house prices at short horizons but may ultimately in-
crease house prices as the quantity of purchases and willingness to pay for housing
rises.
I contribute to this literature in two ways. Firstly I contribute by explicitly
studying the response of house prices to a monetary shock at the horizon which
corresponds to contractual rigidities no longer binding, as well as producing an
impulse response function (IRF) in the style of the existing literature. Secondly I
also consider the addition of controls that are chosen to be specifically relevant to
housing in the generation of my narrative monetary shocks and the estimation of
the shocks effects on house prices. The IRFs produced including these controls are
fairly similar to those produced without the controls and those from the existing
literature. Therefore these results also allow one to have greater confidence in the
estimated effects of monetary shocks on house prices from the existing literature,
even when this literature focuses on estimating the effects of monetary shocks on a
4Results from the literature are also compared to the equivalent empirical results produced in
this paper in Section 4.
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wide range of variables.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 sets out how I use monetary
shocks to test whether house prices are consistent with always being equal to the
adjusted fundamental value of housing, Section 3 presents the results of this test
and the effects of monetary shocks on aggregate house prices in the US, Section
4 presents the new stylised facts on the relative importance of different proximal
drivers of US housing cycles and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Testing whether house prices are consistent with
fundamentals using monetary shocks
The fundamental value of a house in the absence of rational bubbles is defined as
the full information rational expectation of the net present value of the stream of
rents that are either received from renting the property or saved by living in it
(Glaeser and Nathanson, 2015). Assuming or using assumptions that imply that
house prices are equal to their fundamental value is extremely common across the
housing literature: it is used in virtually all of the macroeconomic models of house
prices surveyed by Piazzesi and Schneider (2016) and is the basis of many of the
papers of housing cycles considered in Glaeser and Nathanson (2015). House prices
being equal to their fundamental value can be mathematically expressed as:






where HP = real house prices, HR = real housing rents, DR = real discount
rate and t denotes the time period.
The logic that is sometimes used for this valuation is that if the price of housing is
below (above) its fundamental value then agents would demand more (less) housing,
increasing (decreasing) house prices and restoring the condition. However there are
rigidities in housing markets, such as search frictions and contractual rigidities, that
may mean that this logic is not applicable. Papers such as Dusha and Janiak (2018)
show how the fundamental value can be adjusted to also incorporate transaction
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costs, such as the cost of time spent searching for the right house. In this case house
prices are equal to the net present value of the housing rents to sellers plus sellers
transaction costs and are also equal to the net present value of the housing rents to
buyers minus buyers transaction costs. One then also needs to adjust for the fact
that in the US house prices are set when both parties sign a legal contract, which
is usually between two and eight weeks before the closure of the deal5. It is not
then generally possible to renegotiate the price unless property specific issues are
found and penalties, such as the loss of earnest money payments, are often imposed
if a party withdraws from the transaction. Therefore the expectations used in the
adjusted fundamental value should be lagged to reflect this. Therefore house prices












− TCbt ) (2)
where HP = real house prices, HR = real housing rents, DR = real discount
rate, TC = real transaction costs, b denotes for buyers, s denotes for sellers and t
denotes the time period.
The logic in this case is similar to above but indicates that more agents will search
for (try to sell) housing if the price is below (above) their fundamental valuation
after adjusting for transaction costs at the horizon that accounts for agents having
to make legal offers prior to exchange.
The test I use for whether house prices are consistent with being equal to their
adjusted fundamental value is based on their reaction to monetary shocks. Mone-
tary shocks are relatively unique in that if house prices are equal to their adjusted
fundamental value they should have a clearly signed response to monetary shocks
as soon as contractual rigidities stop binding. Monetary shocks are by definition
unexpected (Ramey, 2016), so their effects cause changes in the expected values of
sellers and buyers in Equation 2 once the contractual rigidity no longer binds and
new expectations can be used. By considering their likely effect through each of the
5See the origination insight reports from Ellie May for survey data supporting this.
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channels in Equation 2, one can demonstrate that the effects through all channels
are likely to imply that expansionary (contractionary) monetary shocks imply in-
creases (decreases) in house prices if they are equal to the adjusted value of housing
once new expectations can be used. The following paragraphs consider each channel
at a time under the null hypothesis that house prices are equal to their adjusted
fundamental value.
The effects of an expansionary monetary policy shock through discount rates
are relatively clear. The shock will reduce base rates directly. It is also likely to
reduce risk premia, illiquidity premia and other premia that drive the difference
between the housing discount rate and base rates. Theoretically this is likely to be
true as improved economic and financial conditions could reduce housing risk and
risk aversion while increasing housing liquidity, while empirically this is likely to be
true as Gertler and Karadi (2015) show that expansionary monetary policy shocks
reduce the housing finance premium. Therefore the shock is very likely to reduce
discount rates and so increase house prices through this channel.
The effects through housing rents and transaction costs are less simple, and so
are explained with reference to two simple conceptual frameworks that build on the
adjusted fundamental value of housing and are included in the Appendix. The first
also includes consumption demand and housing supply to explain the rents channel
and the second also includes search frictions to explain the transaction cost channel.
The first framework explains the linked markets for housing consumption and hous-
ing ownership in terms of a consumption demand curve in the housing consumption
market, a supply curve in the housing ownership market and an asset demand curve
in both markets. This framework helps to demonstrate why the effect of an expan-
sionary monetary shock on house prices through the consumption channel is very
likely to be positive, even though housing rents themselves may not rise. Theoret-
ically consumption demand is very likely to rise as a result of improved economic
conditions and empirically other forms of consumption rise (Coibion et al., 2017).
This should place upwards pressure on rents in the housing consumption market
and the value of housing in the housing ownership market. However the increase
in asset demand resulting from reduced discount rates will place positive pressure
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on house prices in the housing ownership market but negative pressure on housing
rents in the housing consumption market. Therefore the overall effect on housing
rents is ambiguous, although the effect on house prices should be unambiguously
positive.
The second framework in the Appendix helps to demonstrate how even though
part of the adjustment to an expansionary monetary shock could occur through
search costs, part of it should unambiguously occur through house price rises. Equa-
tion 2 suggests that the only way house prices could fall is if transaction costs for
sellers fall and/or transaction costs for buyers rise sufficiently to outweigh the in-
creases in the discounted stream of rents through the channels discussed above.
However this cannot happen as a result of changed search costs because it would
be inconsistent with bargaining. It would imply that there are more buyers relative
to sellers, which would increases the bargaining position of sellers, as their outside
option has improved, while agents’ valuation of owning a house would increase due
to the shock. Therefore, bargaining should ensure that house prices increase, even
if the shock causes a change in market tightness that affects search costs.
More unusual transmission mechanisms of monetary shocks to house prices are
also likely to either amplify the effects above or not have a significant signed effect.
For instance the analysis in Ngai and Tenreyro (2014) suggests that there will be
thick market effects if the expansionary shock increases the quantity of housing
traded, as seems likely after an expansionary monetary shock. One can also be
confident that monetary shocks won’t rapidly cause significant changes in any other
aspects of housing that investors have direct preferences over, such as housing’s
environmental, social and governance (ESG) impacts.
Therefore one can be confident that monetary shocks should have unambiguously
signed effects on house prices once contractual rigidities no longer bind if they are
equal to the adjusted fundamental value of housing. This is not true for most other
shocks, as the reaction of base rates will act in the opposite direction from most
other channels in aggregate demand shocks and the reaction of housing supply will
operate in in the opposite direction from most others channels in aggregate supply
shocks. Therefore we cannot say that there should be a clearly signed response of
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house prices to most shocks: in theory it will be ambiguous and even in practice if
we suspect a sign it may well be sufficiently small that we cannot detect it.
The null hypothesis of the test of whether house prices are consistent with al-
ways being equal to there adjusted fundamental value is therefore that expansionary
(contractionary) monetary shocks increase (decrease) house prices at a horizon of
one to two months. This is only a test of consistency with house prices being equal
to their adjusted fundamental value, as alternate explanations of house prices may
also imply that they respond to monetary shocks rapidly. Therefore the test can, at
least in theory, reject the hypothesis that house prices are equal to their adjusted
fundamental value, but it cannot prove it. However several prominent alternate ex-
planations of house prices could imply that house prices respond much more slowly
to monetary shocks. For instance agents may not have accurate information on
shocks in real time, violating the full information assumption, so would not be able
to react to shocks as rapidly. Agents may also have non-rational expectations as
they may not use all available variables when forecasting, due to the amount of
effort involved, or may not adjust forecasts to complex new information, due to not
understanding it. Therefore they may not react until easily accessible and under-
standable information on shocks becomes available. Indeed, even if there are only
some agents that have non-rational expectations then those agents that do have
rational expectations may exacerbate deviations from fundamental values (Brun-
nermeier and Oehmke, 2013), as no agent is wealthy enough to materially affect
aggregate US house prices alone. Therefore evidence against the hypothesis would
fit with these alternate explanations of house prices.
To identify monetary shocks I build on the narrative approach of Romer and
Romer (2004)6. These shocks were originally constructed by regressing the intended
change in the effective federal funds rate around Federal Open Market Committee
meetings on the Federal Reserve’s internal forecasts of its macroeconomic targets.
6I don’t use high frequency shock measures based on futures markets for two reasons. Firstly,
Miranda-Agrippino (2016) as well as Romer and Romer (2000) suggest that Federal Reserve fore-
casts are better than private sector forecasts. Secondly, I want to include the largest natural
experiment in the modern era of US monetary policy: the period of non-borrowed reserve target-
ing, and data on high frequency measures is only available for more recent periods.
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However Ramey (2016) suggests that one could also control for the broader state
of financial markets, which transmit monetary policy and so are also taken into
account by the Federal Reserve. This is likely to be especially important in the
case of an asset price like house prices, so I also include the Chicago Fed financial
conditions index, the effective federal funds rate, the 5 year term spread and the 30
year mortgage rate as additional financial controls in the baseline case. However I
also repeat the estimation without these additional controls to assess the changes
they may cause. The baseline generating regression is therefore:
∆iintt = φ





















t + εt (3)
where iintt = the intended federal funds rate, EFR(x) = the federal reserve’s
expectations of variable x, π = inflation, gr = GDP growth, un = unemployment
and fin = financial control variables, t denotes the time period, i denotes the quarter
of the forecast and ranges from -1 to 2, j ranges from 1 to 4.
To estimate the effect of monetary shocks on real house prices, I use these narra-
tive monetary shocks in the local projection method of Jorda (2005). This approach
is robust to the exact data generating process of real house prices and directly esti-
mates their response to the narrative shocks at each forecast horizon. This is crucial
when the timing of effects is of particular interest, as it allows me to be confident
that the timing results from the genuine correlations between real house prices and
monetary policy shocks at different lags and not simply from a mis-specified model.
Ramey (2016) also suggests that the small sample estimates with narrative mon-
etary shocks could be improved by including additional lagged controls, so I also
include short (one year) and long (four year) real house price changes, real housing
rents changes and housing starts. I also repeat the estimation without these addi-







γk HV kt−1 + εt (4)
where lnHP = log real house prices, s = the narrative monetary shocks, HV =
housing control variables, t denotes the time period, h denotes the horizon and k
ranges from 1 to 6.
I bootstrap across both stages of the process to account for the generated regres-
sors in the standard errors. Specifically, I use a block normal bootstrap with block
length of a year to allow for the additional variance produced by any remaining
auto-correlation in the errors. This bootstrap approach is computationally efficient,
as it only requires bootstrapping moments of the distribution instead of its extreme
values, so I use 1000 repetitions at each forecast horizon.
I can then formally test whether there is a statistically and economically signif-
icant reaction of real house prices to monetary shocks at a horizon of one to two
months. I can also calculate estimated impulse response functions of real house
prices to monetary shocks. These let me compare my results to those from the ex-
isting literature and check that the overall sign of the response of real house prices
is consistent with the narrative shocks not simply capturing endogenous movements
in base rates and that the shocks are not so rapidly reversed that an identified
expansionary shock is effectively a contractionary shock.
3 Conducting the test with narrative monetary
shock data
I now move on to conducting the test of whether US real house prices are consistent
with always being equal to their adjusted fundamental value by estimating the
response of aggregate US house prices to narrative monetary shocks at different
horizons.
As discussed in Section 1, I produce the narrative shocks by using the approach of
Romer and Romer (2004) but also including additional financial control variables. I
therefore estimate Equation 3 and take the residuals as the narrative monetary shock
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series. This approach yields shocks which have very low levels of auto-correlation
and are highly variable, so to present them graphically I take a one year moving sum.
The resulting series is plotted in Figure 1. There are several periods in which the
existing literature identifies clear narratives for exogenous loosening or tightening
based on a combination of political and operational reasons. The first and largest
of these is the period of non-borrowed reserve targeting from 1979-1982. However
political pressure for loose policy in the late 1970s and the early 2000s as well as the
desire to gain credibility in the 1990s are also commonly suggested7. All of these
are visible in the shock series.
Figure 1: Moving sum of monetary shocks
Notes: Plot of the one year centered moving sum of the narrative monetary shocks gener-
ated from Equation 3. The vertical axis is in percentage points and the horizontal axis is
in years.
To estimate the effect of monetary shocks on real house prices, I use the narrative
monetary shocks in the local projection method of Jorda (2005) with additional
lagged housing controls, as discussed in Section 1. I therefore estimate Equation 4
at each horizon considered to produce an IRF of real house prices to a monetary
shock. The data used is the monthly repeat transactions house price index produced
by Freddie Mac deflated with CPI index. In the Appendix I also repeat the main
7See Romer and Romer (2004) and the sources cited therein for details
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analysis in this paper using Case-Shiller data and the results are very similar.
Figure 2 shows the IRF of real house prices to a one percentage point decline in
the narrative shock measure, which is a large expansionary shock but less than the
largest absolute value observed in the shock series. The IRF is plotted to a horizon
of eight years and a 95% confidence interval is shown along wit the central estimates.
It is clear that the effects of the shocks near impact is virtually zero. This is not just
because the effects of the narrative monetary shocks are always small, which could
be the case if the monetary shocks measure partly capture endogenous influences or
if monetary shocks are rapidly reversed and overcompensated for. The cumulative
effect slowly rises from approximately zero to economically and statistically signifi-
cant responses that are maintained over horizons of several years before declining to
ultimately have effects close to zero again. The maximum effects occur at horizons
of approximately two to five years, where a one percentage point expansionary shock
causes an approximately three percentage point increase in real house prices, which
is generally statistically significant at the 95% level. Therefore the monetary shocks
do have significant effects, they just do not appear to occur near impact.
Table 1 plots the effects of a one percentage point decline in the narrative mone-
tary shock measure at a horizon of one and two months to more formally examine the
results at the horizons indicated by the test. The effect of the shocks at these hori-
zons is virtually zero, both economically and statistically, quantitatively confirming
what can be seen visually in Figure 2. The change corresponds to only about a
tenth of a percentage point in real house prices after a large (one percentage point)
monetary shock and is not statistically significant at any reasonable level. There is,
therefore, effectively no response near impact. The scale of the actual changes caused
by the shocks in the data reinforces the messages above. The estimates suggest that
even the approximately 3 percentage point increase in the narrative shocks at the
height of the period of non-borrowed reserve targeting, easily the largest shock in
the series, caused virtually no change in real house prices near impact, but caused
a fall in real house prices of approximately 8% after two to three years.
The result that monetary policy shocks have no effect on house prices near impact
is also consistent with visual inspections of IRFs of real house prices to monetary
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Figure 2: Impulse response function of real house prices to a monetary shock
Note: Plot of the estimated cumulative log change in real house prices in response to a one
percentage point decrease in the narrative federal funds shock measure with bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals. The vertical axis is is units, so 0.05 corresponds to a 5% increase,
and the horizontal axis is in years since the shock.
shocks near impact in existing empirical work. The vast majority of work appears to
find essentially no effects near impact, but significant effects of with a lag measured in
years. This is true for older papers, such as Fratantoni and Schuh (2003), Del Negro
and Otrok (2007), Jarociński and Smets (2008) and Musso et al. (2011), that use
timing and sign restrictions in auto-regressive models. It is also true of newer papers,
such as Jorda et al. (2015a), Ungerer (2015), Coibion et al. (2017) and Alessi and
Kerssenfischer (2019) that mainly use narrative shocks. These papers find that a
one percentage point expansionary monetary shock has a maximum positive impact
on house prices of between one and ten percent. Therefore the existing empirical
literature implicitly provides strong support for the results of my test.
It is also necessary to consider the effects that the control variables have on
my results, as some of these controls are an addition to those commonly used in
the literature to estimate the empirical effects of monetary shocks. Figure 3 shows
the IRFs produced using no additional controls in the shock generation estimation
(upper panel) or the local projection estimation (lower panel). The results are
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Table 1: Response of real house prices to monetary shocks near impact
Cumulative real house price growth h = 1 h=2
Monetary shocks -.001 -.001
(-.002 to .001) (-.004 to .002)
House price growth (1 year) .118* .235*
(.069 to .167) (.135 to .334)
House price growth (4 years) -.011 -.025
(-.033 to .010) (-.068 to .019)
Housing rents growth (1 year) .014 .015
(-.105 to .133) (-.232 to .262)
Housing rents growth (4 years) -.005 -.008
(-.048 to .037) (-.094 to .079)
Log housing sales (1 year) -.000 -.001
(-.001 to .000) (-.002 to .001)
Log housing sales (4 years) .000 .000
(-.000 to .000) (-.001 to .001)
Constant .015 0.024
(-.089 to .120) (-.187 to .236)
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.413
Notes: The left column shows estimates of the effects of a one percentage point increase
in the narrative federal funds shock measure at a one month horizon and the right column
shows estimates at a two month horizon. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are shown
and * = significant at the 5% level.
broadly similar to those in the baseline case, especially for the upper panel. All three
IRFs have virtually no effects near impact, then slowly rise to have economically and
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statistically significant effects of approximately three percent at horizons of several
years before declining again. The only clearly noticeable differences between the
IRFs are whether real house prices are just above or just below their initial level
at horizons over six years and even these differences are not large. Therefore the
controls do not appear to be responsible for changing the results of the estimation
dramatically.
Figure 3: Impulse response function of real house prices to a monetary shock with
fewer controls
Note: Plots of the estimated cumulative log change in real house prices in response to a one
percentage point decrease in the narrative federal funds shock measure with bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals. The vertical axis is is units, so 0.05 corresponds to a 5% increase,
and the horizontal axis is in years since the shock. The upper panel uses no additional
controls in the shock generation estimation and the lower panel uses no additional controls
in the local projection estimation.
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This increases the confidence one can have in the results presented here, as the
results in Figure 3 function as robustness checks. However it also may increase
the confidence one could have in the results from the literature that estimate the
effects of narrative monetary shocks on a wide variety of variables without including
variable specific controls because, at least in the case of housing, these additional
controls do not appear to be necessary.
Taken together, these results provide strong evidence against the hypothesis that
house prices are always consistent with being equal to their fundamental value, even
after this fundamental value is adjusted for search frictions and contractual rigidities.
The results are, however, consistent with agents not observing monetary shocks well
in real time or agents’ expectation not reacting rationally to available information
on monetary shocks. I would suggest that both of these factors are likely to play
a role in explaining the results. Identifying monetary shocks in real time is clearly
hard, as even experts struggle to identify monetary shocks (Ramey, 2016). Also
many agents in housing markets are clearly not experts and so survey evidence,
such as that in Case et al. (2012), suggests that some homebuyers do not have
rational expectations. Monetary shocks do not seem relatively harder to measure or
understand than many other shocks. Indeed, identifying monetary shocks benefits
from the Federal Reserve having very clearly specified aims, presenting its policy
tools in quantitative form and publishing information which Ericsson (2016) shows
can be used to essentially infer its information. The equivalent is not necessarily
true for other shocks, such as productivity shocks or financial shocks. This suggests
that agents may struggle to observe or use expectations that respond rationally to
many macroeconomic shocks. Therefore models of housing markets based on full
information rational expectations, which are common in macroeconomics, may be
seriously mis-specified so their implications could be very misleading.
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4 New stylised facts on the drivers of housing cy-
cles
The two conceptual framework in the Appendix are primarily introduced to explain
why monetary shocks are very likely to have an unambiguously signed effect on house
prices once contractual rigidities no longer bind. However the first framework also
implies a sign decomposition8 that can be used to analyse the relative importance
of proximal drivers of house price movements. These proximal drivers are some
of the channels through which the ultimate shocks that drive housing cycles are
transmitted. This first conceptual framework explains the linked markets for housing
consumption and housing ownership with a consumption demand curve that directly
affects the housing consumption market, a supply curve that directly affects the
housing ownership market and an asset demand curve that directly affects both
markets. This implies the following effects of shifts in the curves, where all effects
are normalised to increase real house prices: shifts in housing supply, such as those
generated by housing regulation or building cost changes will reduce the quantity
of housing and increase real rents. Shifts in consumption demand, such as those
generated by higher incomes or consumer confidence, will increase the quantity of
housing and real rents. Shifts in housing asset demand, such as those generated
by increased real house price expectations or easier housing credit will increase the
quantity of housing and reduce real rents. This implies the correlation structure for
movements driven by each type of shift in Table 2.
It is important to note that these frameworks aim to capture some of the main
mechanisms in housing markets and I do not claim to capture all mechanisms in
housing markets. This is why I limit the models to sign analysis that seems unlikely
to be invalidated by including other variables. One aspect of this simplification
is that I use one variable for each series, rather than including separate variables
for each expected future value of the series. Therefore it is appropriate to apply
the sign restrictions to components of the variables that have enough persistence9
8This sign decomposition is also very likely to remain valid if the search frictions in the second
framework are included too, as discussed in the Appendix.
9This is one of the reasons why it was necessary to confirm in the previous section that the
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that there will not be lagged effects that more than offset the effects of an initial
change in a variable. As a result of this, and the interest in housing cycles due to
their macroeconomic consequences, I focus on the cyclical components of housing
variables. Burns and Mitchell (1946) historically suggested that business cycles
occur at lengths of 1.5 to 8 years, however Drehmann et al. (2012) suggests that
more recent housing cycles can have longer lengths, so in the baseline case I extract
cyclical components with cycles of between 3 years and 40 years. However, I extract
cyclical components with longer maximum cycle lengths and shorter minimum cycle
lengths in the Appendix and there are no meaningful changes in my main results.
The correct filter to extract cycles from data depends upon the exact data being
analysed. Parametric approaches such as unobserved components models require
a model with very specific assumptions over the form of the components to be
kept or removed. Therefore the cycle obtained can reflect the assumed model as
much as the data in question. Non-parametric approaches, such as band-pass filters,
overcome this main problem. These filters aim to isolate the components of a variable
driven by cycles at a specified range of frequencies and so fit with the definition of
housing cycles used here. It is necessary to difference any data used to remove
unit roots before applying these techniques (Murray, 2003) and use a finite sample
approximation to the ideal filter (Baxter and King, 1999). Band-pass filters include
the desired frequencies from all components of the series: signal components and
noise components. Therefore it is important to check that there really are strong
auto-correlations in the data before being using a band-pass filter. Therefore, in
practice, one has to understand the order of integration and persistence of the data
before deciding exactly how, and whether it is appropriate at all, to use them. To
aid this decision in the case of real house prices, Table 3 displays the results of
applying integration tests to real house prices in levels and growth rates and the
auto-regressive parameters from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
Despite the low power of unit root tests, the results support the assumption used
narrative monetary shocks do have sensibly signed effects on house prices at reasonable horizons, as
otherwise they might be so rapidly more than reversed that what was identified as an expansionary
shock would effectively be a contractionary shock.
22













HR - - 1
Notes: Cyclical correlations based on shifts in the three curves in the first conceptual
housing market framework. The top correlation matrix denotes a shift in housing supply,
the middle correlation matrix denotes a shift in housing consumption demand and the
bottom correlation matrix denotes a shift in housing asset demand. HP = real house
prices, HR = real housing rents and HQ = the quantity of housing.
in previous work, such as Drehmann et al. (2012), that real house prices contain a
unit root in levels but not in growth rates. Therefore there is no non-stationary
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Table 3: Integration and persistence properties of monthly real house prices
Level Growth rate
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test - *
Phillips-Perron test - *
Elliot et al. test * *
Dickey-Fuller persistence parameter 1.00 0.88
Notes: Results of applying integration tests to real house prices in levels and growth rates.
The null hypothesis of the tests is integration of order of at least one and * = significant
at the 5% level.
issue when applying a band-pass filter to real house price growth. The real house
price growth series is highly persistent in growth rates, so I use the Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2003) filter. This filter is fairly accurate for persistent processes, as it
is derived from a random walk, and has the advantage of allowing filtered values to
be constructed for all time periods in the sample. The high persistence of the series
and visual inspection of the raw data suggest that the filter will primarily capture
cyclical signal, rather than certain frequencies from noise.
Figure 4 shows the extracted cyclical component of monthly real house price
growth data. A very clear cyclical component emerges, which is similar to that
produced in Drehmann et al. (2012). It is associated with US recessions: it has
small troughs alongside the 1980s Volcker recessions and the early 1990s recession
and a significant trough alongside the great depression. In all these cases it also
peaks towards the end of the preceding booms. The only exception to this is that
there is little decline around the dot-com recession.
I now produce equivalent cycles for rents and the quantity of housing supplied.
Since real house prices are in growth rates I would ideally also take the growth rates
of real rents and the housing stock. For real rents I use the growth rate of the
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Figure 4: Cyclical element of real house price growth
Notes: Plot of the component of monthly real house price growth rates with frequen-
cies that give cycles of between 3 and 40 years in length, extracted with the Christiano-
Fitzgerald filter. The vertical axis is in percentage points and the horizontal axis is in
years.
CPI rent of primary residence series. Since there is no complete time series data on
the US housing stock available, I use housing starts from the Census Bureau as a
proxy. These series also conform to typical guides for stationarity. I apply the same
Christiano-Fitzgerald filter to these series as applied to real house price growth to
housing starts and real rental price growth. These cyclical components of these two
variables are plotted in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. They both appear reasonable:
the cyclical component of housing starts appear to be fairly similar to the real house
price cycle and so is also related to the US business cycle, as measured by NBER
recessions. There does not appear to be as clear a cycle in rents as the other two
variables, but some downturns are visible.
I now have data series which correspond to the cyclical changes in the three main
variables from the conceptual framework. Therefore their empirical associations can
be used to judge the relative importance of housing consumption demand, housing
asset demand or housing supply, based on which of the predicted associations in
Table 2 are closest to the empirical associations. This may seem similar in principle
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Figure 5: Cyclical element of housing starts
Notes: Plot of the component of monthly log housing starts (scaled up by 100 in construc-
tion) with frequencies that give cycles of between 3 and 40 years in length, extracted with
the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter. The vertical axis is in units and the horizontal axis is in
years.
to a sign restricted VAR or FAVAR, however there are important differences. Firstly,
in my setting I do not assume that the changes I am capturing are independent
and exhaustive, as I am clear in my conceptual framework that I am identifying
transmission mechanisms, not structural shocks. For instance, a credit supply shock
is extremely likely to influence both the asset and consumption demand for housing
over time. Secondly, I don’t use a very specific statistical model to try to remove all
past correlations and trends, but instead aim to keep particular cyclical components
of interest, so have far more flexibility and robustness. On the other hand this
flexibility implies that I cannot conduct the formal decompositions associated with
sign restricted VARs or FAVARs and can only compare relative importance. Thirdly,
sign restricted VARs impose their restrictions, so give no evidence as to the validity of
the restrictions themselves, whereas I do not impose my restrictions when calculating
correlation structures, so could obtain a result which simply supports the rejection
of the conceptual framework.
To study the empirical associations between the three variables I calculate stan-
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Figure 6: Cyclical element of real housing rental price growth
Notes: Plot of the component of monthly real housing rental price growth rates with
frequencies that give cycles of between 3 and 40 years in length, extracted with the
Christiano-Fitzgerald filter. The vertical axis is in percentage points and the horizon-
tal axis is in years.
dard linear correlations and Spearman rank correlations, in case there are important
non-linear associations. In both cases I produce confidence intervals using a block
normal bootstrap with block length of a year, which is asymptotically valid as both
statistics are asymptotically normal. The linear correlation matrix and 95% confi-
dence intervals are displayed in Table 4. The results show a very strong positive and
significant correlation between the house price series and the housing starts series.
Even at the lower end of the confidence interval this correlation is still economically
significant and at the top end it is close to perfect positive correlation. The corre-
lations between the housing rents series and the other two series are also positive,
but they are weaker and only significant in one of the two cases.
Table 5 shows the Spearman rank correlation matrix. The rank correlations
are extremely similar to the linear correlations: there is a very strong positive and
significant correlation between the house price series and the housing starts series
and the correlations between the housing rents series and the other two series are
also positive, but they are weaker and less significant. Therefore there do not appear
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HR 0.27* 0.27 1
(0.06 to 0.49) (-0.03 to 0.56)
Notes: Linear correlations between the cyclical components of real house price growth,
real rental price growth and housing starts. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are
also shown and * = significant at the 5% level. HP = real house prices, HR = real housing
rents and HN = the quantity of new houses started.
to be important non-linear associations between the variables and the results of the
rank correlations simply support the results of the linear correlations.
The strong and significant positive correlations between the house prices and
housing starts variables shows that housing supply shifts are clearly the least im-
portant of the three cyclical transmission mechanisms. This does not imply that
there are no supply effects, but only that they are strongly outweighed by consump-
tion and asset demand shifts as a driver of housing market cycles. The positive
correlations between the housing rents variable and each of the other two variables
suggests that consumption demand is the most important driver of housing cycles.
However, the correlations between housing rents and the other two variables are
weaker than those between house prices and housing starts and only two of the four
correlations are statistically significant. Therefore, asset demand changes may also
have been important and in particular unusual periods could even have been the
most important driver. For instance it is interesting that the only period in which
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HR 0.31* 0.27 1
(0.04 to 0.57) (-0.03 to 0.57)
Notes: Linear correlations between the cyclical components of real house price growth,
real rental price growth and housing starts. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are
also shown and * = significant at the 5% level. HP = real house prices, HR = real housing
rents and HN = the quantity of new houses started.
cyclical real house price growth and housing starts appear to grow significantly ac-
companied by a decrease in cyclical real rental price growth is during the early 2000s
housing boom, suggesting that shifts in asset demand may have outweighed shifts
in housing consumption in this period. However over most of the sample shifts in
consumption demand were the most important, shifts in asset demand were also
relatively important and shifts in housing supply were the least important proximal
drivers of US housing cycles.
5 Conclusion
It is important to understand if house price fluctuations are driven by changes in
fundamentals, because if they are not then this implies the potential for housing
bubbles that could have serious macroeconomic consequences. However assessing
whether changes in house prices are driven by changes in the fundamental value of
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housing is extremely difficult, especially once the definition of fundamental value
is adjusted to account for the search frictions and contractual rigidities in housing
markets.
In this paper I introduce a new test of whether real house prices are consistent
with always being equal to the adjusted fundamental value of housing. This test is
based on the idea that monetary shocks should cause clearly signed reactions in the
adjusted fundamental value of housing as soon as contractual rigidities no longer
bind: an idea that I support with two conceptual frameworks and references to ex-
isting empirical work on the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. Therefore
I test whether real house prices have a significant reaction to monetary shocks at
the horizon when contractual rigidities no longer bind, which is within two months.
I implement this test using narrative monetary shocks, which are constructed
with the Romer and Romer (2004) approach, but augmented with finance and hous-
ing specific controls. The reaction of real house prices to these shocks is estimated
using local projections to accurately capture the timing of the reactions. The results
show that there are no statistically significant or economically meaningful reactions
of real house prices to monetary shocks within two months of a monetary shock.
However IRFs show that there are statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful responses at horizons greater than a year and are similar to IRFs in the
existing literature. Therefore the results provide strong evidence that house prices
are not consistent with always being equal to the fundamental value of housing, even
after this fundamental value has been adjusted for search frictions and contractual
rigidities.
Instead the results are consistent with explanations such as agents’ inability to
observe monetary shocks precisely in real time or agents expectations not reacting
rationally to available information about monetary shocks. Monetary shocks are
not necessarily harder to observe than other shocks, and may well be easier, as the
Federal Reserve publishes a large amount of information on its aims, expectations
and policy tools in quantitative form. No similar information is available for other
shocks such as productivity or financial shocks, suggesting that agents are unlikely
to precisely observe and adjust their expectations rationally to these shocks either.
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As a result the many recent macroeconomic models that assume agents in housing
markets use full information rational expectations may be seriously mis-specified
and so may be of little practical relevance.
In additional work I also use a sign decomposition, suggested on the basis of
the conceptual frameworks, to analyse the relative importance of different proximal
drivers of US housing cycles. I implement this decomposition using linear and rank
correlations between the cyclical components of different housing variables, where
the cyclical components are extracted using an appropriately chosen band-pass filter.
I find that the consumption demand channel has been the most important proximal
driver of housing cycles, the asset demand channel has also been relatively important
and the housing supply channel has been clearly the least important.
These results suggest that changes in house prices do not always result from
changes in the fundamental value of housing, even after adjusting for the frictions in
housing markets. The results are instead consistent with agents not observing many
shocks and not adjusting their expectations rationally in reaction to information on
shocks. Therefore housing cycles are likely to arise from the partially behavioural





This section of the Appendix introduces two conceptual frameworks that build on
the expression for the fundamental value of housing10 introduced in Section 2. One
which uses the basic fundamental value expression in a system with housing con-
sumption and housing supply and one which uses the fundamental value expression
with search frictions and bargaining. The first of these demonstrates the transmis-
sion of monetary shocks through housing rents, and suggests a sign decomposition
for the proximal drivers of house price fluctuations, while the second demonstrates
the transmission of monetary shocks through search costs.
I start with the first framework, in which the housing market effectively consists
of two interrelated areas: housing consumption and housing ownership. The real
prices of housing consumption are real rents and the real prices of housing ownership
are real house prices. The total quantity of houses that people desire to own and the
total number of houses that people live in and so consume the housing services of are
equal. Therefore there are three key variables in the market: real house prices, real
housing rents and the quantity of housing. Clearly these are not the only relevant
variables in reality, so I limit my analysis to the sign of likely effects and specify
that this is under the assumption that no excluded variables have sufficiently large
counteracting effects to change the signs implied here.
I initially consider the standard fundamental value condition and show that this
is likely to be a special case of a more general expression of housing asset demand in
this framework. The fundamental value condition is an expression for house prices
that is a positive function of housing rents. However it is also likely to be a negative
function of the quantity of housing agents choose to own, which I call housing asset
demand. This is because as agents choose to own more housing they will have to
bear more of the risks associated with housing, since asset classes are imperfect
10As discussed in the main text, throughout this paper house prices, housing values, housing
rents and other related variables are all considered in real terms unless stated otherwise.
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substitutes for one another, so the premia attached to the specific risks in housing
are likely to rise. This in turn can be easily rearranged to give an expression for
the quantity if housing owned, i.e. housing asset demand, that falls with real house
prices and rises with real housing rents, as follows:























where HP = real house prices, HR = real housing rents, DR = real discount rate,
HAD = housing asset demand and fx denotes a function with the sign of differentials
given by + or - above variables.
This expression is sensible. Housing asset demand is very likely to increase in
real housing rents, as these, or the ability to forgo paying them to others, are part
of the real return of holding a housing investment along with expected price changes
and non-monetary benefits. Housing asset demand is also very likely to decrease
with real house prices, as this is the price of purchasing the expected stream of real
returns.
I can then use similar logic to also construct equivalent signed expressions for
housing consumption demand and housing supply. I start by considering the sup-
ply of housing. It will be more profitable for businesses and households to supply
additional housing if the real price they receive for it is higher. Therefore housing
supply is very likely to increase with real house prices. Whereas, I assume that
housing supply only responds to real housing rents in so far as they affect real house
prices. Next I consider the demand for housing consumption, which includes the
consumption of housing services from houses that agents own. When real rents are
high agents face a high price for housing consumption and are very likely to demand
less of it. Therefore housing consumption demand is a negative function of real
housing rents. Whereas, I assume that the demand for housing consumption supply
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only responds to real house prices in so far as they affect real housing rents.
























Notes: Plots of the conceptual functions for housing supply, housing consumption demand
and housing asset demand, all measured in terms of the housing stock, as a function of
either real housing rents or real house prices in the first conceptual framework. The upper
panel shows the housing consumption market and the lower panel shows the housing
ownership market. HS = housing supply, HCD = housing consumption demand, HAD =
housing asset demand, HP = real house prices and HR = real housing rents.
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Therefore the expressions for housing supply, housing consumption demand and













where HS = housing supply, HCD = housing consumption demand, HAD = housing
asset demand, HP = real house prices, HR = real housing rents and fx denotes a
function with the sign of differentials given by + or - above variables.
If the housing market clears, so demand equals supply, then shifts in each of
the curves would have the effects in Table D.1, normalising the effect on real house
prices to be positive. Shifts in housing supply, such as those generated by housing
regulation or building cost changes will reduce the quantity of housing and increase
real rents. Shifts in consumption demand, such as those generated by higher incomes
or consumer confidence, will increase the quantity of housing and real rents. Shifts
in housing asset demand, such as those generated by increased real house price
expectations or easier housing credit will increase the quantity of housing and reduce
real rents. This directly yields the correlation structures implied by the three shifts
in Table 2. It is important to note that these three curves represent the main
transmission mechanisms which underlie the housing market, rather than structural
shocks. Structural shocks need to be independent of one another, which is not the
case for transmission mechanisms.
The effects of an expansionary monetary shock on real house prices can then
be analysed as follows. The reduction in expected base rates, risk and liquidity
premia discussed in Section 2 will increase asset demand at any given levels of
housing rents and house prices, shifting the asset demand curve to the right in the
housing consumption and housing ownership diagrams in Figure D.1. This will
place upwards pressure on house prices and downwards pressure on housing rents.
The expected increase in housing consumption from expected increased economic
and financial conditions discussed in Section 2 will increase consumption demand
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Table 6: Signed effects of shifts in housing market curves
HP HQ HR
Supply + - +
Consumption demand + + +
Asset demand + + -
Notes: Effects implied by the conceptual framework of a shift in each of the three curves,
normalised to increase house prices. HP = real house prices, HR = real housing rents and
HQ = the quantity of housing. All effects are normalised to have a positive effect on house
prices.
at any given level of housing rents, shifting the consumption demand curve to the
right in the housing consumption diagram in Figure D.1. This will place upwards
pressure on housing rents and so indirectly shift the asset demand curve to the right
in the housing ownership diagram in Figure D.1, placing upwards pressure on house
prices. Therefore the overall effect on real housing rents is ambiguous, as the effects
through consumption demand and asset demand operate in opposing directions, so
it is possible for real housing rents to fall in reaction to an expansionary monetary
shock. However real house prices will unambiguously rise, once contractual rigidities
allow them to change, as the asset demand and consumption demand channels will
both drive increases in house prices.
I now move onto the second framework, in which I only consider the market for
housing ownership but now introduce search frictions in this market. Specifically
I assume that it takes time for buyers and sellers to match with one another and
the probability of a successful match in any period for a buyer (seller) decreases
(increases) with the market tightness, i.e. the number of buyers relative to the
number of sellers. I therefore only consider two main variables in this setting: real
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house prices and the market tightness. As with the first conceptual framework,
I acknowledge that these are not the only relevant variables in reality, so I limit
my analysis to the sign of likely effects and again specify that this is under the
assumption that no excluded variables have sufficiently large counteracting effects
to change the signs implied here.
I initially consider the adjusted fundamental value condition, introduced in Sec-
tion 2, with a particular focus on the adjustment for transaction costs, which in this
setting will be driven by the search frictions. I treat the discounted sums of rents as
exogenous valuations of owning a house for buyers and sellers. Since the time spent
searching for a house will be costly, as it will imply reduced leisure or working time,
the longer an agent expects to spend searching the higher their transaction costs
are. This implies that if the market is tighter, so search time increases for buyers
and decreases for sellers, then transaction costs increase for buyers and decrease for
sellers. With exogenous valuations this implies that house prices must fall to stop
it being profitable for a net increase in sellers in the market to occur. Therefore
the adjusted fundamental value of housing implies that house prices are a negative



























where HP = real house prices, HR = real housing rents, DR = real discount rate,
TC = real transaction costs, HDS = the real discounted sum of rents, HB
HS
= market
tightness, b denotes for buyers, s denotes for sellers and mx denotes a function with
the sign of differentials given by + or - above variables.
After a match occurs then the buyer and the seller have to bargain over the price,
as the buyers willingness to pay is greater than the sellers reservation price. Their
relative bargaining strength will determine which level between these two values the
agreed house price is set at. This bargaining strength will be affected by the value
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of each negotiators reserve option of returning to search, which will be lower for
the buyer and higher for the seller if the market is tighter. Therefore house price
bargaining implies that house prices are a positive function of market tightness, as
follows:
HP = HDSs + φ (HDSb −HDSs)











where HP = real house prices, HDS = the real discounted sum of rents, HB
HS
= market tightness, φ = sellers’ relative bargaining strength between 0 and 1, b
denotes for buyers, s denotes for sellers and mx denotes a function with the sign of
differentials given by + or - above variables.
Therefore the relationships between real house prices and housing market tight-
ness implied by the conceptual functions for the adjusted fundamental value of hous-
ing and the house price bargaining condition have different signs. Since only the
housing ownership market is considered and the discounted sum of rents is treated
as exogenous in this conceptual framework these two functions are the only ones
considered. They are plotted in Figure D.2.
The effects of an expansionary monetary shock in this framework can then be
analysed as follows. The effects on base rates, premia and consumption demand
would raise the discounted sum of housing rents for both buyers and sellers. This
would cause both the adjusted fundamental value curve and the house price bargain-
ing curve in Figure D.2 to shift upwards. Therefore the effect on market tightness
is ambiguous, so it is possible that the response to the shock includes a change in
market tightness. However both curves will place upwards pressure on house prices,
so house prices will unambiguously rise regardless of the change in market tightness.
It is also worth noting that one could expand the first framework, which includes
the housing ownership and consumption markets, to also include the search frictions
from the second framework in the housing ownership market. In this case the es-
timated signed effects from the first framework would remain true as long as the
38









Notes: Plots of the relationships between real house prices and housing market tightness
implied by the functions for the adjusted fundamental value of housing and the house price
bargaining condition in the housing ownership market of the second conceptual framework.
AFV = adjusted fundamental value of housing and HPB = house price bargaining condi-
tion.
original mechanisms were not entirely counteracted by changes in search costs from
the response of market tightness. Such a change in market tightness in response
to shifts in housing consumption demand, housing asset demand or housing supply
shocks seem extremely unlikely to be compatible with both asset demand and house
price bargaining behaviour, even if these are not exactly as described in the second
framework. Therefore the signed effects of the shifts in Table D.1 are very likely to
remain the same in such a setup.
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B Cycle periodicity robustness
This section of the Appendix contains the robustness checks from increasing the
maximum cycle length and reducing the minimum cycle length of the cyclical com-
ponents extracted from the housing variables. The following graphs and tables show
the cyclical components and the associations between them but either extend the
maximum cycle length extracted to 50 years or reduce the minimum cycle length
extracted to 1.5 years. In both cases the results are similar to those in the baseline
case.
Figure 9: Cyclical element of real house price growth with longer cycles
Notes: This repeats the graphs from Figure 4 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 3 and 50 years in length.
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Figure 10: Cyclical element of housing starts with longer cycles
Notes: This repeats the graphs from Figure 5 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 3 and 50 years in length.
Figure 11: Cyclical element of real housing rental price growth with longer cycles
Notes: This repeats the graphs from Figure 6 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 3 and 50 years in length.
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HR 0.26* 0.31 1
(0.03 to 0.48) (-0.01 to 0.62)
Notes: This repeats the results from Table 4 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 3 and 50 years in length.





HR 0.24 0.20 1
(-0.03 to 0.51) (-0.14 to 0.53)
Notes: This repeats the results from Table 5 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 3 and 50 years in length.
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Figure 12: Cyclical element of real house price growth with shorter cycles
Notes: This repeats the graphs from Figure 4 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 1.5 and 40 years in length.
Figure 13: Cyclical element of housing sales with shorter cycles
Notes: This repeats the graphs from Figure 5 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 1.5 and 40 years in length.
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Figure 14: Cyclical element of real housing rental price growth with shorter cycles
Notes: This repeats the graphs from Figure 6 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 1.5 and 40 years in length.





HR 0.26* 0.20 1
(0.03 to 0.50) (-0.08 to 0.47)
Notes: This repeats the results from Table 4 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 1.5 and 40 years in length.
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HR 0.27* 0.23 1
(0.03 to 0.50) (-0.03 to 0.49)
Notes: This repeats the results from Table 5 but with frequencies that give cycles of
between 1.5 and 40 years in length.
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C Housing data source robustness
This section of the Appendix contains the robustness checks from using different
real house price data. It repeats the analysis in Section 3 and Section 4 but using
the Case-Shiller real house price index. The following graphs and tables show the
cyclical components, the associations between them and the impulse response to a
monetary shock. In all cases the results are similar to those in the main text.
Figure 15: Cyclical element of real house price growth
Notes: This repeats the graph from Figure 4 but uses the Case-Shiller real house price
index.
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Figure 16: Cyclical element of real housing rental price growth
Notes: This repeats the graph from Figure 6 but deflating rents in line with the deflator
used in the Case-Shiller real house price index.





HR 0.21 0.25 1
(-0.03 to 0.45) (-0.05 to 0.55)
Notes: This repeats the results from Table 4 but with the Case-Shiller real house price
index and deflator.
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HR 0.24 0.20 1
(-0.04 to 0.52) (-0.10 to 0.49)
Notes: This repeats the results from Table 5 but with the Case-Shiller real house price
index and deflator.
Figure 17: Impulse response function of real house prices to a monetary shock
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